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Hindsight bias in insight and mathematical
problem solving: Evidence of different
reconstruction mechanisms for metacognitive
versus situational judgments
IVAN K. ASH
Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
AND

JENNIFER
R WILEY
University of Illinois, Chicago, Illinois
This article presents two experiments that used insight and mathematical problems to investigate whether diff
ferent factors would affect hindsight bias on metacognitive and situational judgments. In both studies, participants
initially rated their likelihood of solving each problem within a certain amount of time (metacognitive judgments)
and rated the importance of each component of the problem for finding the solution (situational judgments). Next,
participants attempted to solve each problem. In Experiment 1, all participants were given solution feedbackk
information, but in Experiment 2, participants were not given any solution feedback. After 1 week, participants
were asked to recall their original judgments. Hindsight bias was assessed by comparing the initial with the final
ratings. Insight problems and math problems showed different patterns of hindsight bias effects on the metacognitive and situational judgments. The results suggest that two competing models of hindsight effects are actually
complementary
p
y explanations
p
for judgment
j g
reconstruction on different types
yp of judgment
j g
tasks.

There is an old saying that “hindsight is 20/20.” The
hindsight effect describes the observation that once people are aware of the outcome to a situation, they have a
tendency to falsely believe that they would have predicted
that outcome. This retrospective judgment bias is robust
across a wide variety of domains and task environments
(see Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Guilbault,
Bryant, Brockway, & Posavac, 2004; Hawkins & Hastie,
1990, for reviews). Although researchers have systematically studied this effect for over 30 years, there is still not a
unified theory of the effect that can explain results across
different judgment types and task domains.
Researchers have proposed two classes of cognitive reconstruction models to explain how retrospective judgment
formation leads to the hindsight effect (Hawkins & Hastie,
1990). Anchor and adjust theories propose that people
produce their retrospective judgments by starting with the
given outcome and adjusting their judgment away from that
anchor, based on metacognitive cues. One proposed adjustment mechanism is that people might attempt to recall how
“surprising” they found the given outcome to be and adjust
their judgment on the basis of this metacognitive information (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1989; Ofir & Mazursky, 1990,
1997). According to this theory, if a person recalls that the
outcome was expected,
p
, he or she would gget an “I would

have known that!” feeling. Based on this metacognitive information, a person will make a small adjustment from the
given outcome, thereby overestimating his or her predictive
accuracy. It is this underadjustment that leads to hindsight
bias. On the other hand, if a person recalls that the outcome was surprising, he or she would get an “I would have
never known that!” feeling. This metacognitive information
would lead the person to make a larger retrospective adjustment, thereby reducing the likelihood of hindsight bias.
The second class of explanations for the hindsight effect can be considered updating and rejudging theories
(Carli, 1999; Hasher, Attig, & Alba, 1981; Hawkins &
Hastie, 1990; Pezzo, 2003; Roese & Olson, 1996; Wasserman, Lempert, & Hastie, 1991; Wiley & Trabasso, 2003).
According to this perspective, exposure to outcome information affects the mental representation of the event
or situation. Outcome knowledge can affect the memory
representation by rendering outcome-supporting information more available in long-term memory or by reducing
the weight given to the evidence supporting other possible
outcomes (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). According to this
theory, hindsight bias occurs because people use this updated representation to reconstruct their predictive opinions. Because the representation of the event has changedd
to be more supportive
pp
of the actual event outcome,, a perp
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son will overestimate his or her predictive accuracy. Thus,
it is the representation change caused by acquiring outcome knowledge that leads to hindsight bias.
In the present studies, we investigate whether these different explanations of the hindsight bias should be viewed
as competing accounts of the same effect, or whether these
theories may represent explanations of different judgment
phenomena that have been grouped under the umbrella
term hindsight bias. There are two main paradigms that
have been used to investigate hindsight effects: trivia tasks
and case study tasks (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham,
1991; Guilbault et al., 2004; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990).
These paradigms also differ in the kinds of judgment tasks
they use for the bases of the hindsight measure. Below, we
argue that anchor and adjust theories of the hindsight bias
may provide a more appropriate explanation for hindsight
effects that are traditionally found in trivia task paradigms,
whereas updating and rejudging theories may provide a
more appropriate explanation for the effects traditionally
found in case study paradigms. We support this distinction
in two experiments that use a problem solving paradigm
to investigate the role of different types of judgment tasks
on hindsight bias effects.
Trivia T
T
Task Versus Case Study Paradigms
Trivia task paradigms present a general knowledge
question as the target event or situation to be judged, such
as, “What percentage of Germans live in cities with more
than 100,000 inhabitants?” (Schwarz & Stahlberg, 2003,
p. 399). People are generally asked to judge the likelihood
of getting the answer correct. The feedback in these experiments consists of either being told the correct answer
to the question or being given feedback about the accuracy of one’s own response. In this paradigm, researchers have found hindsight bias effects on several different
types of measures, including predictions of their own (or
their peers’) likelihood of producing the correct response
to a question (e.g., Hoch & Loewenstein, 1989); numeric
answers to problems or trivia questions (e.g., Schwarz &
Stahlberg, 2003); and confidence ratings for answers to
forced-choice trivia questions (e.g., Koriat, Lichtenstein,
& Fischhoff, 1980). On these types of judgment tasks, the
predictive and retrospective judgments are metacognitive in nature because people must use their beliefs about
their own knowledge or abilities in the domain to formulate their judgments. Therefore, it seems reasonable that
people may use their metacognitive reactions to outcome
feedback (i.e., the “I would have known that!” feeling) as
cues in reconstructing their previous metacognitive judgments. We propose that the judgment reconstruction processes described by anchor and adjust theories provide a
plausible explanation for hindsight bias effects on these
types of metacognitive judgment tasks.
Case study paradigms present a narrative story or description of a situation, such as a medical case history
(Arkes, Faust, Guilmette, & Hart, 1988) or a story describing an upcoming event (e.g., Fischhoff, 1975). Participants
are generally asked to predict the outcome of the event.
The feedback in these experiments consists of a conclusion
to the story or description of the “true” outcome. In this
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paradigm, researchers have found hindsight bias effects
on two different types of measures: outcome-likelihood
predictions and evidence-importance judgments (see, e.g.,
Carli, 1999; Fischhoff, 1975; Wasserman et al., 1991).
Outcome-likelihood predictions are produced when people
are asked to judge the probability of different possible outcomes of the event or situation. Hindsight bias on this type
of measure is observed as higher retrospective likelihood
ratings for the given outcome. Evidence-importance judgments are produced when people are asked to rate the importance or relevance of each sentence or piece of evidence
presented in the narrative or case history, in terms of determining the outcome. Hindsight bias on this type of measure is observed as higher retrospective importance ratings
for outcome-supporting information. In this paradigm, the
predictive and retrospective judgments that relate to the
task are comprehension or representation based. This is because people must use their understanding of the evidence
and how it relates to an outcome in order to produce their
judgments. We propose that in these tasks, changes to the
mental representation may lead to changes in retrospective
judgments. Therefore, the judgment reconstruction processes described by updating and rejudging theories seem
to provide a plausible explanation for hindsight bias for
these types of situational judgment tasks.
EXPERI
R MENT 1
In Experiment 1, we collected metacognitive judgments, such as those used in trivia tasks, and situational
judgments, such as those used in case study tasks, using
the same stimulus materials. The goal was to see whether
patterns of hindsight bias depended on the nature of the
judgment tasks. Multicomponent mathematical and insight problems where chosen as the stimulus materials
because complex problem solving has both performance
and representational aspects that can be assessed. The performance aspect involved in problem solving tasks makes
these stimuli similar to those used in trivia task paradigms
and allows for the assessment of predictive and retrospective metacognitive judgments. However, unlike most simple trivia or general knowledge tasks, complex problem
solving also has a representational aspect that makes it
comparable to case study paradigms. Most problem solving theories and computational models of problem solving include the formation of a mental representation of
the problem as an initial phase (e.g., Anderson & Lebiere,
1998; Newell & Simon, 1972). Kintsch (1998) proposed
that the formation of a mental problem representation relies on the same cognitive processes as the comprehension
of events, situations, or texts. Therefore, complex problem solving tasks also lend themselves to situational judgments, such as those used in case study paradigms.
Insight and mathematical problems were chosen in order
to differentiate between effects due to metacognitive reactions and those due to representational updating (see the
Appendix for a list of problems). Insight problems have
long been used to study how people overcome representational difficulty and find creative solutions (e.g., Duncker,
1945; Maier, 1931). The types of problems used in insight
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research are designed to be unfamiliar and misleading, and
typically lead people to form initial mental problem representations that are inappropriate for finding the correct
solution path (Kaplan & Simon, 1990; Knoblich, Ohlsson,
Haider, & Rhenius, 1999; Metcalfe, 1986a, 1986b; Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987; Ohlsson, 1992; Wiley, 1998). Many
researchers have proposed that people overcome the representational difficulties posed by these problems through
cognitive processes that change or restructure the initial
faulty problem representation (Ash & Wiley, 2006; Durso,
Rea, & Dayton, 1994; Jones, 2003; Kaplan & Simon,
1990; Knoblich et al., 1999; Ohlsson, 1992). Multistep
mathematical problems were chosen as a contrast class
of problems for which most college students should have
ample prior experience. On these problems, participants
should have well-practiced strategies and analogous problems available in long-term memory that should help them
avoid forming inappropriate representations (e.g., Ross &
Kilbane, 1997). Therefore, the solution of mathematical
problems should be highly unlikely to involve representational change or restructuring processes.1
These problems were used as the stimuli in a withinparticipants hindsight bias paradigm, such as those commonly used in trivia-based hindsight investigations (e.g.,
Pohl & Hell, 1996; Schwarz & Stahlberg, 2003). Participants
were initially asked to make metacognitive judgments (likelihood of solving) and situational judgments (importance
of each problem component) for each problem. Then they
were given 3 min to attempt to solve each problem. Outcome
feedback was given in the form of step-by-step explanations
of each problem solution. A week later, participants returned
and attempted to remember their initial ratings. Hindsight
bias was assessed as the changes between initial ratings
(predictions) and memory rating (retrospections).
Solutions to both types of problems used in this study
involved a series of simple steps to complete. Therefore,
we propose that exposure to the solutions to either type
of problem should have been equally likely to elicit an
“I would have known that!” reaction. Anchor and adjust
theories would therefore propose that both problem types
should be susceptible to hindsight bias effects. However,
insight problems are more likely to involve representational change or restructuring than are mathematical problems. Therefore, updating and rejudging theories would
predict that insight problems should be most susceptible
to the hindsight bias. Specifically, this theory would predict that hindsight bias effects should be most prevalent
on successfully solved insight problems, due to the spontaneous restructuring that occurs as part of the insightful
problem solving process (Dominowski & Buyer, 2000).
Method
Participants. Fifty-one introductory psychology students from
the University of Illinois at Chicago Subject Pool completed both
sessions of this experiment for partial fulfillment of a class research
participation requirement.
Materials. The problem stimuli comprised four insight problems
and four multistep math problems that were chosen or designed for this
study (see the Appendix for problems and note 1 for the manipulation
check). The elements of each problem were categorized as being relevant or irrelevant for solution. Relevant components were those parts of

the problem that needed to be used or manipulated to correctly solve the
problem. For example in the “Camp Alaska” math problem (Appendix,
Problem 4), the three people going on the camping trip were an adult
male, an adult female, and a male teen. Therefore, the components in
the chart that corresponded to these values were the relevant components. All other components in the chart were unnecessary in order to
solve the problem. Therefore, these parts of the problem were irrelevant
components. An insight problem example is the “Six Glasses” problem (Appendix, Problem 6). In order to solve the problem, one had to
pour the liquid from the second glass into the fifth glass. The fifth glass
was therefore the relevant component. The first, third, fourth, and sixth
glasses were the irrelevant components. The second glass was excluded
because it was implied to be important in the solution in the directions,
and therefore any possible solution (even if incorrect) had to involve it.
This component was therefore considered to be nondiagnostic in assessing the appropriateness of an individual’s problem representation.
The Appendix lists all insight and math problems used in this study. The
relevant components for each problem are underlined.
The initial rating packet comprised eight different paper-andpencil rating packets that presented the problems in a counterbalanced order, with the constraints that every other problem was
either an insight or math problem and that each problem was the
first and last problem in one of the orders. The cover page of the
packet instructed participants to carefully read each problem without
attempting to solve the problem. Instead, they were told that they
would be asked a series of opinion questions about each problem.
The directions stressed that we did not want them to begin solving
the problems and that we were interested in their initial impressions
of the problems. The directions also explained the rating procedure
continuum for the questions described below.
The first page for each problem presented the entire problem below
the sentence, “Please read this problem. Do NOT attempt to solve.”
Underneath the problem were general opinion questions about the
problem, including the question, “How likely is it that you will complete this problem correctly in 3 minutes?” Below this question was a
7.3-cm continuum anchored with not very likelyy on the left and very
likelyy on the right. This rating served as the predictive metacognitive
judgment. On the following pages, each component of the problem
was listed with the directions to “Please rate each component on how
important it will be in solving the problem.” Below each problem
component was a 7.3-cm continuum with not importantt on the left and
very importantt on the right. These ratings were combined (as detailed
below) to serve as the predictive situational judgment.
The problem solving packet presented the same eight problems,
each on its own page, in the same order as in the rating booklet.
The directions were presented on the cover page of the booklet. The
directions informed participants that they would be given 3 min to
complete each problem. The directions asked participants to show all
work, circle their final answer, and explain their solution in writing,
if necessary. The directions explicitly stated that all problems had
solutions and that answers such as impossible or not solvable would
be counted as incorrect. Finally, the directions instructed participants
to wait for the experimenter’s signal before beginning each problem.
Following their solution attempts, we showed all participants the
correct solution to each problem. For each problem, we created a
script providing a step-by-step explanation of the correct solution
procedure. Also, for each problem, we created a corresponding overhead projector slide that procedurally and/or graphically displayed
the correct solution process. For example, the “Camp Alaska” slide
had each of the three components used in solving the problem underlined and then showed each necessary mathematical calculation. The
“Six Glasses” problem slide showed a graphical representation of
the initial problem situation, a picture of the contents of the second
glass being poured into the fifth glass, and a final solution representation, with the empty glass returned to its original position.
The rating memory packet was identical to the initial rating packet,
except the directions asked participants to “Attempt to remember your
original ratings from last week’s session. In other words, do NOT rate
these problems again. Try to remember the point in the scale that rep-
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resents your original opinion of these problems.” Furthermore, on
each page of the booklet, “Please reproduce your original ratings from
last week’s session” appeared over each set of questions. Participants
were asked to remember their rating for “How likely is it that you will
complete this problem correctly in 3 minutes?” The rating from this
question served as the retrospective metacognitive judgment. Likewise, the ratings from the component importance questions were combined to serve as the retrospective situational judgment.
Procedure. In Session 1, participants completed the study in
groups of 3 to 12 and were randomly assigned to one of the eight problem orders. Participants sat so that those with the same-ordered packet
were not placed next to each other. The session began with participants
completing the informed consent form. Next, participants completed
the initial rating packet. Upon completing the rating packet, participants attempted to solve each problem in the problem solving packet.
Participants were given a maximum of 3 min to solve each problem.
The experimenter kept time with a stopwatch and alerted the group
when there were 30 sec left for solving. Before moving on to the next
problem, the participants were reminded to circle their final answer, if
they had reached one. After the problem solving phase was complete,
the experimenter showed step-by-step solutions for each problem in
a random order. The experimenter read a script that walked through
each solution, and presented an overhead slide outlining the procedure. Each solution explanation took approximately 1 min. Finally,
the experimenter asked participants not to discuss the experiment with
anyone, including other members of the group.
In Session 2, participants returned to the same room exactly 1 week
later and were seated in the same positions. The experimenter gave
each participant a rating memory packet that matched the order of
their Session 1 packets, as well as another problem solving packet.
The experimenter read the directions for the rating memory packet
while the participants followed along. The experimenter asked the
participants to pay close attention to the directions because they diff
fered from the previous week’s directions. After completing the memory task, participants attempted to solve each problem again and were
debriefed, reminded not to discuss the experiment, and dismissed.
Data coding. We coded the likelihood ratings by measuring the
distance of the participant’s mark on the 7.3-cm continuum with a
ruler, so that lower scores indicated lower likelihood of solving and
higher scores indicated higher likelihood of solving. We coded the
component importance ratings in the same way. On these ratings,
lower scores indicate lower importance ratings and higher scores indicate higher importance ratings. Since all problems have different
ratios of relevant and irrelevant components, we averaged the ratings
across relevant and irrelevant components within each problem. Next,
the scores on the irrelevant components were reverse-coded, so that
higher values on both types of components represented more appropriate problem representations. Finally, we combined average relevant
and average reverse-coded irrelevant measures into a single component importance score by taking the unweighted average of the two
indexes. The higher the component importance score, the closer the
individual was to the correct problem representation for solution.
For the problem solving phase, we had instructed participants to
circle their final answer on each problem. Therefore, we coded any
problem with a correct, circled final answer as a successfully solved
problem. We coded all other problems as unsuccessfully solved
problems. Within the unsuccessfully solved problems, we tallied
two different types of failures: incorrect and unsolved. We coded
problems as incorrectly solved if participants had circled a final answer that did not match the correct solution. We coded all problems
without a circled final answer as unsolved problems.

Results
Quasi-experimental design and analysis strategy.
Our research question was not whether certain classes of
people (i.e., more intelligent, less intelligent) would be
more likely to show hindsight bias, but rather discerning
when hindsight would be observed, keeping all other things
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constant. Therefore, we needed to make within-participants
comparisons of insight and math problems for both successful and unsuccessful solution attempts. Therefore, we
selected participants who both correctly and incorrectly
solved at least one of the insight and math problems. Otherwise, different groups of people would have contributed
data in each condition, and any effects could be due to characteristics of the groups (i.e., good vs. poor problem solvers) rather than to the variables of interest. This participant
selection procedure was based on Metcalfe’s (Metcalfe,
1986a, 1986b; Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987) work investigating
metacognition and problem solving. Of the 51 participants
who completed the study, 25 participants had data in each
cell and were included in the analyses below.
For the within-participants sample, a dependent samples
t test comparing the mean proportion of successfully solved
math and insight problems revealed no difference in solution success rates [math, M  .49, SE  .034; insight, M 
.45, SE  .038; t(24)  0.70, p  .49, d  0.14]. Table 1
displays the number of successful, incorrect, and unsolved
observations for each problem. As the table shows, there was
considerable variability in success rates within the math and
insight problems. Because of this variability among problems, we aggregated the rating data both by participants
and by problems in order to examine hindsight effect as a
function of problem type and solution success.
The by-participants analysis resulted in a 2 (judgment:
predictive vs. retrospective)  2 (problem type: insight vs.
math)  2 (solution success: successful vs. unsuccessful)
repeated measures design with 25 observations per cell.2
This analysis controlled for individual differences among
problem solvers, but allowed individual problems to contribute more or less to each solution success category, depending on their solution rates. A planned comparison approach was adopted on the by-participants analysis in order
to maximize power.3 To investigate the effects of problem
type and solution success on hindsight bias, we conducted
retrospective–predictive contrasts at alpha level  .05 for
each of the problem type  success conditions.
The by-problems analysis resulted in a 2 ( judgment:
predictive vs. retrospective)  2 (problem type: insight vs.
T
Table
1
Experiment 1 Solution Rates (Frequency and Percentage)
Unsuccessful
Successful
Math Problems
Solve for Y
Cash
Distance
Food
Total
Insight Problems
Triangle
Glasses
Match III
Match XV
Total
Note—N  25.

Incorrect

Unsolved

Freq.

%

Freq.

%

Freq.

%

9
10
14
16
49

36
40
56
64
49

9
15
6
6
36

36
60
24
24
36

7
0
5
3
15

28
0
20
12
15

18
15
5
7
45

72
60
20
28
45

1
8
13
7
29

4
32
52
28
29

6
2
7
11
26

24
8
28
44
26
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A

Likelihood Ratings By-Participants

Prediction
Retrospection

Mean Likelihood Ratings

7
d  0.53

d  0.24

d  0.46

d  0.43

Successful

Unsuccessful

Successful

Unsuccessful

6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Math

B
Mean Likelihood Ratings

7

Insight

Likelihood Ratings By-Problems

Prediction
Retrospection

d  1.56

d  0.64

d  1.38

d  1.04

Successful

Unsuccessful

Successful

Unsuccessful

6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Math

Insight

Figure 1. Experiment 1 mean predictive and retrospective metacognitive
judgments (solution likelihood ratings) as a function of problem type and solution. Error bars  standard error; d  Cohen’s d.
d

math)  2 (solution success: successful vs. unsuccessful)
mixed design, with problem type as a between-problems
variable. Once again, we conducted a retrospective–
predictive contrast for each of the problem type  success
conditions. Since this analysis has only four observations
per cell, this design provided very low power for detecting
hindsight effects. However, the main point of this analysis was to examine whether the effects observed in the
by-participants analysis were due to specific problems or
were consistent across problems. Therefore, these effects
will be examined descriptively, in order to assess whether
they follow the same qualitative pattern as that for the byparticipants analyses.
Hindsight bias for metacognitive judgments.
Panel A of Figure 1 displays the mean predictive and
retrospective likelihood ratings as a function of problem
type and solution success for the by-participants analysis.
Panel B of Figure 1 displays the same data when ratings
are aggregated in a by-problems analysis. The size of the
hindsight effect for each category was calculated using
Cohen’s d and is displayed over each pair of observations.

The results of the four predictive versus retrospective
judgment contrasts are displayed in Table 2 for both the
by-participants and by-problems analyses.
From the by-participants analysis, significant hindsight
bias on likelihood ratings was detected on successfully
solved math problems, successfully solved insight problems, and unsuccessfully solved insight problems. The eff
fect for unsuccessfully solved math problems was in the
same direction as that for the other conditions. However,
this effect was approximately half the size of the effect in
the other conditions and was not statistically significant. The
by-problems analysis followed the exact same pattern as the
by-participants analysis. This suggests that the effects observed in the by-participants analysis were consistent across
problems and were not driven by any individual problem.
Hindsight bias for situational judgments. Panel A
of Figure 2 displays the mean predictive and retrospective
component importance scores as a function of problem
type and solution success for the by-participants analysis.
Panel B of Figure 2 displays the same data when scores
are aggregated in a by-problems analysis. The size of the
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Table
2
Experiment 1 ANOVAs for Pairwise Contrasts of Predictive and
Retrospective Metacognitive Judgments (Likelihood Ratings),
Type and Solution Success
As a Function of Problem T
95% Confidence Interval
Contrast

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

F

p

By-Participants Analysis
Math
Successful
Unsuccessful
Insight
Successful
Unsuccessful

0.82
0.36

1.34
0.88

0.29
0.16

10.40
2.03

.004
.167

0.70
0.66

1.22
1.18

0.18
0.13

7.62
6.71

.011
.016

By-Problems Analysis
Math
Successful
0.90
1.54
0.27
12.07
.013
Unsuccessful
0.37
1.01
0.27
2.03
.204
Insight
Successful
0.80
1.43
0.16
9.44
.021
Unsuccessful
0.60
1.24
0.04
5.34
.060
Note—MSSe for the rating  problem  success interaction was used for the calculation of confidence intervals and F ratios (by-participants MSSe  .802; by-problems
MSSe  .135). For the by-participants analysis, df  1,24; for the by-problems analysis, df  1,6.

Mean Component Importance

A

Component Importance Scores By-Participants
Prediction

7

Retrospection

6

d  0.32

d  0.11

d  0.79

d  0.02

Successful

Unsuccessful

Successful

Unsuccessful

5
4
3
2
1
0

Math

Mean Component Importance

B

Insight

Component Importance Scores By-Problems
Prediction

7
6

Retrospection
d  0.60

d  0.34

d  1.98

Unsuccessful

Successful

d  0.52

5
4
3
2
1
0
Successful

Math

Unsuccessful

Insight

Figure 2. Experiment 1 mean predictive and retrospective situational judgments (component importance scores) as a function of problem type and solution success. Error bars  standard error; d  Cohen’s d.
d
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Table
3
Experiment 1 ANOVAs for Pairwise Contrasts of Predictive and
Retrospective Situational Judgments (Component Importance Scores),
Type and Solution Success
As a Function of Problem T
95% Confidence Interval
Contrast

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

F

p

By-Participants Analysis
Math
Successful
Unsuccessful
Insight
Successful
Unsuccessful

0.29
0.10

0.72
0.53

0.15
0.34

1.83
0.20

.189
.659

0.70
0.02

1.14
0.42

0.26
0.46

10.85
0.01

.003
.921

By-Problems Analysis
Math
Successful
0.24
1.02
0.53
0.59
.472
Unsuccessful
0.15
0.92
0.62
0.22
.656
Insight
Successful
0.81
1.58
0.03
6.52
.043
Unsuccessful
0.21
0.98
0.56
0.44
.532
Note—MSSe for the rating  problem  success interaction was used for the calculation of confidence intervals and F ratios (by-participants MSSe  .562; by-problems
MSSe  .200). For the by-participants analysis, df  1,24; for the by-problems analysis, df  1,6.

hindsight effect for each category was calculated using
Cohen’s d and is displayed over each pair of observations.
The results of the four predictive versus retrospective
judgment contrasts are displayed in Table 3 for both the
by-participants and by-problems analyses.
From the by-participants analysis, significant hindsight
bias on component importance judgments was detected
only on successfully solved insight problems. The effects
for all other problem type and solution conditions were
substantially smaller and failed to approach statistical significance. The by-problems analysis followed the exact
same pattern as did the by-participants analysis. This suggests that the effect observed on successfully solved insight problems was consistent across problems and was
not driven by any individual problem.
Discussion
In Experiment 1, the hindsight patterns observed on
the two types of judgments qualitatively differed. On the
metacognitive judgments (solution likelihood ratings),
hindsight bias was observed on both math and insight
problems. However, on situational judgments (component
importance scores), hindsight bias was only observed on
successfully solved insight problems. This pattern supports the notion that hindsight bias for these different types
of judgments represents different psychological phenomena and requires different theoretical explanations. The
pattern of results for metacognitive judgments in this experiment seems most consistent with the basic premises
of the anchor and adjust theories that suggest that people
use metacognitive responses to outcome information in
order to reconstruct their judgments. On the other hand,
the pattern of hindsight bias on the component importance
ratings is more consistent with the updating and rejudging
explanation of hindsight bias.
One interesting aspect of the results of this experiment
was that the hindsight effects differed as a function of

both problem type and solution success. On the metacognitive judgments, significant hindsight bias was detected
in all conditions, except for unsuccessfully solved math
problems. In the introduction to this experiment, we proposed that exposure to correct solutions should lead to an
“I would have known that!” reaction, regardless of problem type. However, the observed pattern suggests that
exposure to the solutions to unsuccessfully solved math
problems did not evoke the same metacognitive reaction
as it did in the other conditions.
Problem type and success also affected hindsight bias
in the situational ratings. Although a substantial hindsight
effect was detected on correctly solved insight problems,
we found no evidence of hindsight bias on unsuccessfully
solved insight problems. This moderating effect of solution
success was not completely unexpected; it is consistent
with evidence from prior insight studies that have shown
that restructuring may only occur when a person actually
solves an insight problem, and not simply as the result of
being told the solution (Dominowski & Buyer, 2000).
Theories of the hindsight effect that describe it as an
outcome knowledge effect would suggest that any knowledge of an outcome should be enough to produce the effect. However, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that
there may be different sources of feedback that may lead
to different kinds of hindsight effects: internal feedback
that comes from self-generated solution attempts and outcome knowledge from external feedback, such as being
told the correct solutions. In Experiment 2, we seek to better understand the role that internally generated outcome
knowledge may play in producing hindsight effects.
EXPERI
R MENT 2
The effects of solution success on the hindsight bias
we found in Experiment 1 suggest that the externally provided outcome feedback was not the only factor leading to
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changes in retrospective judgments. We propose that the
act of actively attempting to solve a problem may provide
internally generated feedback that may have independent
effects on retrospective judgment formation. However,
we were unable to find any studies that have specifically
looked for hindsight bias effects on successfully and unsuccessfully solved problems in the absence of externally
provided feedback. Therefore, in this study, we replicated
the procedure of Experiment 1. However, after the participants attempted to solve the problems, we did not provide
them with any solution feedback. There were two goals of
this experiment. The first goal was to investigate the role
of internally generated feedback in hindsight effects on
metacognitive and situational judgments. The second goal
was to see whether the effects caused by internally generated feedback would replicate the disassociations between metacognitive and situational judgments that were
observed in Experiment 1. We predicted that hindsight
bias on metacognitive judgments should follow a pattern
consistent with anchor and adjust explanations of hindsight bias, and hindsight bias on situational judgments
should follow a pattern consistent with updating and rejudging theories of hindsight bias. Therefore, we again
predicted similar hindsight bias patterns on metacognitive
judgments for both math and insight problems. However,
we predicted hindsight bias on situational judgments only
for successfully solved insight problems.
Method
Participants. Forty-eight introductory psychology students from
the University of Illinois at Chicago Subject Pool completed both
sessions of this experiment for partial fulfillment of a class research
participation requirement.
Materials and Procedure. All of the materials and the procedure used in this experiment were identical to those in Experiment 1.
The only difference occurred at the end of Session 1. In this experiment, participants were dismissed from Session 1 directly after the
problem solving phase of the experiment. Therefore, no one in this
study was shown the step-by-step solutions, and no one received any
external feedback about the accuracy of their solutions.

Results
Quasi-experimental design and analysis strategy.
Once again, we created a fully within-participants design
by selecting only participants who correctly and incorrectly
solved at least one of each of the problem types. Out of
the 48 participants who completed the study, 30 had solution patterns that conformed to these criteria. A dependent
samples t test comparing the mean proportion of successfully solved math and insight problems revealed no overall
difference in solution success rates [math, M  .45, SE 
.035; insight, M  .43, SE  .032; t(29)  0.65, p  .52,
d  0.12]. Table 4 displays the number of successful, incorrect, and unsolved observations for each problem. Once
again, there was considerable variability in success rates
within the math and insight problems. Therefore, we aggregated the rating data both by participants and by problems
in order to be able to assess whether hindsight bias patterns
were consistent across participants and problems.
The by-participants analysis resulted in a 2 (judgment:
predictive vs. retrospective)  2 (problem type: insight
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Table
4
Experiment 2 Solution Rates (Frequency and Percentage)
Unsuccessful
Successful
Freq.
%
Math Problems
Solve for Y
Cash
Distance
Food
Total
Insight Problems
Triangle
Glasses
Match III
Match XV
Total
Note—N  30.

Incorrect
Freq.
%

Unsolved
Freq.
%

8
11
22
13
54

27
37
73
43
45

10
16
5
16
47

33
53
17
53
39

12
3
3
1
19

40
10
10
3
16

12
22
7
10
51

40
73
23
33
43

10
5
10
6
31

33
17
33
20
26

8
3
13
14
38

27
10
43
47
32

vs. math)  2 (solution success: successful vs. unsuccessful) repeated measures design with 30 observations per
cell. The by-problems analysis resulted in a 2 (judgment:
predictive vs. retrospective)  2 (problem type: insight vs.
math)  2 (solution success: successful vs. unsuccessful)
mixed design with problem type as a between-problems
variable and four observations per cell. In order to investigate the effects of problem type and solution success on
hindsight bias, we conducted a retrospective–predictive
judgment contrast at alpha level  .05 for each of the
problem type  solution success conditions.
Hindsight bias for metacognitive judgments.
Panel A of Figure 3 displays the mean predictive and
retrospective likelihood ratings as a function of problem
type and solution success for the by-participants analysis.
Panel B of Figure 3 displays the same data when ratings
are aggregated in a by-problems analysis. The size of the
hindsight effect for each category was calculated using
Cohen’s d and is displayed over each pair of observations.
The results of the four predictive versus retrospective
judgment contrasts are displayed in Table 5 for both the
by-participants and by-problems analyses.
The by-participants analysis revealed a large hindsight
bias on successfully solved math problems and a moderate
hindsight bias on successfully solved insight problems. In
both of these conditions, participants’ mean retrospective
likelihood ratings were higher than their presolution-attempt
predictive ratings. This pattern replicates the Experiment 1
finding of hindsight bias effects for successfully solved
math and insight problems. As in Experiment 1, there was
no significant hindsight bias effect detected on unsuccessfully solved math problems. However, unsuccessfully
solved insight problems followed a different pattern from
that seen in Experiment 1. In this experiment, participants
showed a reverse hindsight bias, producing significantly
lower retrospective likelihood ratings after unsuccessful
solution attempts on insight problems. The by-problems
analysis revealed the same overall pattern of results as did
the by-participants analysis, although in this analysis, only
the large hindsight effect observed on successfully solved
math problems reached statistical significance.
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Likelihood Ratings By-Participants

Prediction
Retrospection

Mean Likelihood Ratings

7

d  0.70

d  0.12

d  0.34

Unsuccessful

Successful

d  0.39

6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Successful

Math

B

Unsuccessful

Insight

Likelihood Ratings By-Problems

Prediction
Retrospection

7

Mean Likelihood Ratings
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d  1.50

d  0.22

d  1.06

Successful

Unsuccessful

Successful

d  1.18

6
5
4
3
2
1
0

Math

Unsuccessful

Insight

Figure 3. Experiment 2 mean predictive and retrospective metacognitive
judgments (solution likelihood ratings) as a function of problem type and solution success. Error bars  standard error; d  Cohen’s d.
d
T
Table
5
Experiment 2 ANOVAs for Pairwise Contrasts of Predictive
and Retrospective Metacognitive Judgments (Likelihood Ratings),
Type and Solution Success
As a Function of Problem T
95% Confidence Interval
Contrast

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

F

p

0.60
0.28

21.85
0.70

.000
.410

1.03
0.09
0.13
1.07
By-Problems Analysis

6.00
6.92

.021
.014

By-Participants Analysis
Math
Successful
Unsuccessful
Insight
Successful
Unsuccessful

1.07
0.19
0.56
0.60

1.53
0.66

Math
Successful
0.87
1.71
0.03
6.35
.045
Unsuccessful
0.12
0.97
0.72
0.13
.731
Insight
Successful
0.61
1.46
0.23
3.19
.124
Unsuccessful
0.68
0.16
1.53
3.94
.094
Note—MSSe for the rating  problem  success interaction was used for the calculation of confidence intervals and F ratios (by-participants MSSe  .782; by-problems
MSSe  .237). For the by-participants analysis, df  1,29; for the by-problems analysis, df  1,6.
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Hindsight bias for situational judgments. Panel A
of Figure 4 displays the mean predictive and retrospective
component importance scores as a function of problem
type and solution success for the by-participants analysis.
Panel B of Figure 4 displays the same data when scores
are aggregated in a by-problems analysis. The size of the
hindsight effect for each category was calculated using
Cohen’s d and is displayed over each pair of observations.
The results of the four predictive versus retrospective
judgment contrasts are displayed in Table 6 for both the
by-participants and by-problems analyses.
As in Experiment 1, the by-participants analysis detected
no evidence of hindsight bias on component importance
scores for successfully or unsuccessfully solved math problems. Likewise, a significant hindsight effect was detected
on successfully solved insight problems. After successfully
solving insight problems, participants’ retrospective component importance scores were indicative of a more appropriate problem representation than that indicated by their
initial predictive scores. The opposite pattern was observed
on unsuccessfully solved insight problems. In this condi-

Mean Component Importance

A

tion, participants’ retrospective component importance
scores were significantly lower than their initial scores.
Therefore, participants’ retrospective judgments suggested
a less appropriate problem representation on unsuccessfully
solved insight problems. The by-problems analysis revealed
the same pattern as the by-participants analysis. There was
one notable difference, though. In the by-problems analysis, the magnitude of the hindsight effect for successfully
solved insight problems appeared larger than the effect for
unsuccessfully solved problems. However, when we aggregated the data across problems, the magnitude of the effects
was similar. This suggests that the overall pattern is consistent across problems. However, there may have been some
differences in the magnitude of hindsight effects among
insight problems, which led to the differences in effect size
that were observed in the by-participants analysis.
Discussion
The results of this experiment showed that hindsight eff
fects are not confined to situations in which individuals
receive external outcome feedback. In this experiment,

Component Importance Scores By-Participants
Prediction

7

Retrospection

6
d  0.07

d  0.21

d  0.80

Unsuccessful

Successful

d  0.53

5
4
3
2
1
0
Successful

Math

Mean Component Importance

B

Unsuccessful

Insight

Component Importance Scores By-Problems
Prediction

7

Retrospection

6
d  0.23

d  0.40

d  1.19

d  1.39

Successful

Unsuccessful

Successful

Unsuccessful

5
4
3
2
1
0

Math

831
83

Insight

Figure 4. Experiment 2 mean predictive and retrospective situational judgments (component importance scores) as a function of problem type and solution success. Error bars  standard error; d  Cohen’s d.
d
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Table
6
Experiment 2 ANOVAs for Pairwise Contrasts of Predictive and
Retrospective Situational Judgments (Component Importance Scores),
Type and Solution Success
As a Function of Problem T
95% Confidence Interval
Contrast

Upper Bound

Lower Bound

F

p

By-Participants Analysis
Math
Successful
Unsuccessful
Insight
Successful
Unsuccessful

0.06
0.19
0.71
0.47

0.26
0.14

0.15
1.42

.701
.243

1.03
0.38
0.15
0.80
By-Problems Analysis

19.66
8.82

.000
.006

0.39
0.52

Math
Successful
0.09
0.58
0.40
0.21
.663
Unsuccessful
0.16
0.65
0.33
0.67
.444
Insight
Successful
0.48
0.97
0.01
5.84
.052
Unsuccessful
0.57
0.08
1.06
8.02
.030
Note—MSSe for the rating  problem  success interaction was used for the calculation of confidence intervals and F ratios (by-participants MSSe  .381; by-problems
MSSe  .080). For the by-participants analysis, df  1,29; for the by-problems analysis, df  1,6.

participants were not shown the correct solution to the
problems. However, the internally generated feedback that
resulted from successfully solving math or insight problems
resulted in hindsight bias on metacognitive judgments. In
these conditions, the participants’ retrospective ratings overestimated their predictive likelihood ratings. Effect sizes
suggested that this hindsight bias was larger on successfully
solved math problems than for successfully solved insight
problems. On unsuccessfully solved insight problems, retrospective ratings underestimated original likelihood predictions, resulting in a reverse hindsight bias. Therefore,
in these three conditions, hindsight bias on metacognitive
judgments was in the direction of the internally generated
feedback produced by the successful or unsuccessful solving attempts. Once again, we propose that these results are
consistent with anchor and adjust theories of retrospective
judgment formation. The results on successfully solved
problems suggest that the internally generated feedback
that comes with accepting a successful final solution can
produce the “I would have known that!” feeling which, according to this theory, leads to the hindsight bias (Hoch &
Loewenstein, 1989; Ofir & Mazursky, 1990, 1997).
The larger hindsight bias effect on math versus insight
problems suggested by the effect sizes (see Figure 2) was
also informative. In this experiment, we selected math
problems as stimulus materials to represent a familiar
problem solving domain. It may be that the familiar nature
and procedural solution process for these problems allowed
for more salient, or certain, internally generated feedback.
However, the insight problems were selected to represent
unfamiliar and misleading problem situations for which
individuals do not possess algorithmic strategies for verifying the veracity of their solutions. Therefore, the internally
generated feedback in these situations may be less salient
or lead to less certainty that the correct solution had been
obtained. These observations are consistent with Schwarz
and Stahlberg’s (2003) suggestion that familiarity or exper-

tise in a domain may lead to greater hindsight bias effects
on these types of metacognitive judgments.
It appears that the saliency of internally generated feedback may be reversed for unsuccessfully solved problems.
For math problems, failure cues may not be as salient as
for insight problems. Failing to solve math problems may
happen for mundane reasons, such as miscalculations, that
may not even be noticed by the solver. Thus, salient cues
may not exist when one fails to solve a math problem. This
would explain why no hindsight bias effects were detected
on unsuccessfully solved math problems in either experiment. However, for unsuccessfully solved insight problems, the internal cues associated with failure may be very
apparent. In fact, this internal recognition of “being stuck”
or reaching an impasse plays a central role in some theories
of the insightful problem solving process (e.g., Knoblich,
Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001). This recognition of being at an
impasse could lead to an “I never would have known that!”
feeling, which would explain the direction of the hindsight
effect we observed on unsuccessfully solved insight problems. As in Experiment 1, the hindsight bias patterns on
these metacognitive judgments are best explained by the
anchor and adjust theory of hindsight effects.
The situational judgment results followed a qualitatively different pattern. On these measures, individuals
exhibited hindsight effects only on insight problems. On
successfully solved insight problems, retrospective ratings were biased toward a more appropriate problem representation than were predictive ratings. On unsuccessfully solved insight problems, retrospective ratings were
biased toward a less appropriate problem representation.
The pattern is more consistent with the update and rejudge
explanation of retrospective judgment formation. Representational change, or restructuring, has been proposed
as playing a central role in the insightful solution process
(Ash & Wiley, 2006; Jones, 2003; Kaplan & Simon, 1990;
Knoblich et al., 1999; Ohlsson, 1992). Therefore, it is par-
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ticularly on insight problems that we would expect solvers
to have different presolution and postsolution representations. The best explanation for the hindsight bias pattern
on these judgments is that individuals were using their
final problem representations to reconstruct their initial
predictive judgments. In the case of successfully solved
problems, the participants’ post solution representations
were more appropriate for solving the problem, because
the solvers had restructured their initial representations
as they solved the problem. In the case of unsuccessfully
solved problems, the postsolution representations were
less appropriate for solving problems.
The same effects were not seen for the situational judgments on math problems. Because the difficulty on these
math problems should not stem from inappropriate representations, we would not expect the participants’ postsolution representations for math problems to be structurally
different from their initial representations. According to the
updating and rejudging theory, if there is no representational
change between the time of the predictive and the retrospective judgments, then the judgments reconstructed from the
current representation should not be systematically biased,
because little has been updated. On the basis of these results,
we propose that updating and rejudging theories, once again,
provide the most plausible explanation for the hindsight eff
fect patterns observed on situational judgments.
GENERAL
R
DISCUSSION
In the present experiments, we investigated whether
hindsight effects observed on different types of judgment
tasks could be attributed to a unitary process or, alternatively, whether hindsight effects could be better explained
by judgment-specific cognitive reconstruction theories.
Both experiments found distinct patterns of hindsight for
different problem types and judgment tasks. The results
of both experiments supported the notion that anchor and
adjust theories provide the most plausible explanation of
hindsight bias for metacognitive judgments and that updating and rejudging accounts provide the most plausible explanation of hindsight bias for situational judgments. Thus,
the results offer evidence that two competing models of
hindsight bias are actually complementary explanations
for judgment reconstruction on different types of tasks.
A novel result from this study came from the manipulation of externally provided outcome knowledge across the
two experiments. In most studies of hindsight effects, participants are given outcome knowledge, such as the ending
of a story, the answer to the trivia questions, or feedback
on whether they had guessed or answered correctly. The
general finding is that hindsight judgments are biased in
the direction of the given outcome. However, most hindsight studies that include a performance aspect, such as
trivia question paradigms, simply examine the effects of
solution feedback. Therefore, the analyses in these studies
often collapse hindsight results across successful and unsuccessful solvers. The present study shows that successful
solution attempts lead to the same hindsight effects as externally provided feedback. Therefore, this calls into question whether hindsight effects should be viewed as outcome
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knowledge effects. We propose that hindsight effects are
best conceptualized as being a by-product of judgment reconstruction processes and are not necessarily an outcomeknowledge driven phenomenon (see Schwarz & Stahlberg,
2003, for a similar discussion of this issue). Furthermore,
the differences between hindsight effects on incorrectly
solved insight problems in the two experiments suggest
that a failure to detect hindsight effects does not necessarily suggest that externally provided outcome knowledge
has no effect on retrospective judgments. On unsuccessfully solved insight problems for which participants were
later shown the solutions, participants’ retrospective situational judgments were similar to their initial judgments.
This seems to suggest that outcome knowledge had no eff
fect on the retrospective judgment process. However, when
we consider that participants who were not given feedback
on these problems showed significantly lower retrospective situational judgments, it seems that solution feedback
did indeed have an effect in Experiment 1.
The implications of our discovery of internally generated hindsight effects can be illustrated by comparing our
results to those of a previous study, which used insight and
incremental problems to investigate the effects of outcome
feedback on hindsight effect. Hoch and Loewenstein (1989,
Experiment 5) used a between-participants paradigm to
investigate differences in hindsight bias on insight and
incremental problems.4 In their study, participants were
presented with two problems designed to require insightful
solution processes and two problems designed to require
incremental solution processes. All participants attempted
to solve the problems for 3 min. Afterwards, half of the
participants were immediately asked to predict the percentage of their peers who would correctly solve the problem
(no-feedback, or predictive condition), and the other half
were shown the correct solutions to the problems, and then
asked to make the same judgment (feedback, or retrospective condition). Their results showed a clear hindsight bias
effect on the insight problems and a reverse hindsight bias
effect on the incremental problems.
At face value, these results seem to be inconsistent
with the metacognitive judgment results found in the
present Experiment 1, which showed positive hindsight
bias effects on metacognitive judgments for both types
of problems. However, we propose that the Hoch and
Loewenstein (1989) results were actually just an artifact
caused by the confounding of internal and external feedback in their design. In their investigation, successful
and unsuccessful solvers were grouped together in the
no-feedback group. In Experiment 2, we showed that internally generated feedback led to a large hindsight effect
on metacognitive judgments for successfully solved math
problems, as well as to a negative hindsight bias effect on
unsuccessfully solved insight problems. Therefore, the
pattern of hindsight bias effects observed by Hoch and
Loewenstein’s investigation may have been driven by the
effects of internally generated feedback in their betweenparticipants feedback groups. This example illustrates
the importance of controlling for solution success and
manipulating external feedback when investigating hindsight effects in performance-based paradigms, such as
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problem solving or trivia tasks. Furthermore, this comparison suggests that results from between-participants
hindsight studies should be interpreted with caution when
the design allows for the possibility of uncontrolled internally generated feedback.
Conclusions
The present study supports the general explanation that
the hindsight bias is caused by people’s attempts to reconstruct their original judgments on the basis of cues that are
affected by outcome feedback. Although the preference
for parsimony may lead us to search for a unified explanation of all hindsight bias effects, the empirical evidence
suggests that hindsight bias may be best thought of as a
taxonomic category describing a set of retrospective judgment phenomena. Here we have identified two classes of
judgments, metacognitive and situational, which require
different judgment reconstruction processes in order to
explain the observed patterns of hindsight bias. Hence,
we conclude that the anchor and adjust and update and
rejudge theories should be viewed as complementary explanations of hindsight bias on different types of judgment
tasks, not as competing accounts of the same general retrospective judgment bias.
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NOTES
1. In a separate study, 47 introductory psychology students completed
all eight problems (four insight, four math) while performing a thinkaloud protocol procedure. Video recordings were coded for instances
of impasse by two independent coders (kappa  .92). Analysis of the
percentage of problems categorized as displaying an impasse revealed
that participants were 2.77 times more likely to exhibit signs of impasse
on the insight (M
(  61, SD  21) than on the math ((M  22%, SD 
29) problems [t(46)  7.55, p .001, h2 .55]. Since impasse during
problem solving has been associated with representation difficulties and
restructuring (e.g., Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001), we considered
this to be evidence of the validity of our problem-type manipulation.
2. Because of the low number of incorrect and unsolved observations
across the different problems, it was impossible to examine hindsight
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effects as a function of these two solution types. Therefore, we collapsed
across unsuccessful solutions in all hindsight effect analyses.
3. Meta-analytic reviews of the literature have provided ample evidence
that hindsight bias is a ubiquitous and reliable effect that is extremely diff
ficult to eliminate (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Guilbault,
Bryant, Brockway, & Posavac, 2004). Because of this, we concluded
that any significant hindsight bias effects detected in this study were
highly unlikely to be Type I errors. The primary diagnostic prediction
of our theory is that hindsight bias should be less likely on situational
judgments for the math problems. Therefore, the probability of Type II
error (i.e., failing to detect a hindsight effect for situational judgments
on math problems when it exists in the population) was deemed more of
a threat to the internal validity of this study than was the probability of
Type I error. This is why we chose the more powerful contrast analyses,
using alpha level  .05.
4. In within-participants paradigms, preoutcome predictive and postoutcome retrospective judgments are collected from the same individuals, and hindsight effects are operationalized as the difference between
these judgments (e.g., Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975). Other studies in the
hindsight literature have used between-participants or hypothetical
designs (see Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). In such designs, one group of
participants is asked to make predictive judgments before receiving
outcome information, and a second group is asked to make retrospective judgments after receiving outcome information and being asked to
ignore the information. In these designs, hindsight effects are operationalized as the difference in judgments between the no-feedback and
outcome feedback groups (for more discussions of differences between
within-participants and between-participants hindsight bias designs,
see Hertwig, Gigerenzer, & Hoffrage, 1997; Stahlberg & Maass, 1998;
Werth, Strack, & Förster, 2002).

APPENDIX
For each problem, the individual elements below the instructions were used in the component importance
ratings. Elements that are underlined in each problem were coded as relevant components. All other elements
were coded as irrelevant components. No elements were underlined in the problems that were presented to
participants.
Math Problems
1. Solve for Y. Find the exact number that the variable Y equals by using only the necessary equations from
the set of equations below.
3Z * 3  27

2C  9  Z

PC2D

5Z  11  M

2X  56  A

8M  C  Y

3Y  14  X
2. Bob left home with an ATM card, a credit card, a checkbook, and $70 in his wallet. Below is a list of the
purchases that he made during the day. How much money did Bob have in his wallet at the end of the day?
Location
Corner Diner
Quick Mart
Rapid Transit
Sports Inc.
Fast Food Hut
Movie Plaza
Movie Concession
Rapid Transit
Mickey’s Pub

Type of Purchase
T
Credit
Credit
Cash
Check
Cash
Credit
Cash
Cash
Credit

Amount ($)
15.72
9.75
1.50
75.00
8.72
11.00
15.20
1.50
22.50

Tax ($)
T
1.26
0.78

Tip ($)
2.50

*

*

6.00
0.69

*

*

*

1.22

*

*

*

*

*

1.80

4.50

(Continued on next page)
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3. Jane and Frank are driving from San Francisco to New York City. They have a chart that lists distances
between cities and maximum speed limits on the connecting highways. Jane wants to use this chart to figure
out how far it is from San Francisco to New York City. What is the distance they must drive in order to get from
San Francisco to New York City?
From
Austin, TX
Boston, MA
Cheyenne, WY
Chicago, IL
Detroit, MI
Davenport, IA
Omaha, NE
San Francisco, CA
San Francisco, CA
Toledo, OH
Jacksonville, FL

T
To
Kansas City, MO
New York, NY
Omaha, NE
Toledo, OH
Chicago, IL
Chicago, IL
Davenport, IA
Cheyenne, WY
L.A., CA
New York, NY
Washington, D.C.

Number of Miles
445
280
500
300
455
225
325
450
255
565
660

Speed Limit
55 MPH
65 MPH
70 MPH
70 MPH
65 MPH
55 MPH
65 MPH
65 MPH
45 MPH
65 MPH
55 MPH

4. Larry (age 35), his wife June (age 34) and his son Kenny (age 15) are going on a three-month camping trip
in Alaska. Larry has heard stories of people getting snowed in during camping trips and not having enough food
to survive. He wanted to be sure to send enough supplies to the cabin before he leaves on the trip. Larry got a list
of the amount of supplies needed per-day by people of different age groups. In total, exactly how many pounds
of food supplies will his family need per day?

Age and Gender
Male child
Female senior citizen
Male baby
Male teen
Female teen
Female adult
Male senior citizen
Female baby
Male adult
Female child

Amount Needed per Day (in Pounds)
Bread
Vegetables
Meat
Water
0.9
1.0
1.2
1.9
4.3
3.2
3.6
6.5
0.5
0.8
0.4
1.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.2
2.5
3.5
3.0
4.4
4.0
3.7
3.5
5.5
4.4
4.5
2.0
6.7
0.5
0.8
0.6
1.1
3.5
4.0
3.3
6.0
0.9
1.4
1.0
2.0

Insight Problems
5. The triangle shown below points to the top of the page. Show how you can move 3 circles to get the triangle
to point to the bottom of the page.
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6. The picture below is of six glasses. The first three contain liquid. Describe how you could make it so no
two glasses containing liquid are next to each other, while keeping three of the six glasses full. To do this, you
are only allowed to move one glass.

Note—The second cup is used in both the correct solution and the most common incorrect solution (moving
the second cup to the end). Therefore, this component was not used in the calculation of relevant or irrelevant
components.
7. Below is a picture of an equation in which the Roman numerals are constructed using matchsticks. Notice
that both sides of the equation are not mathematically equal. Describe how you could make both sides equal
by moving only one matchstick. The rules are that: (a) only one stick is to be moved; (b) a stick cannot be discarded; that is, it can only be moved from one position in the equation to another; (c) a slanted stick cannot be
interpreted as a vertical matchstick; and (d) the result must be a correct arithmetic statement.

8. Below is a picture of an equation in which the Roman numerals are constructed using matchsticks. Notice
that both sides of the equation are not mathematically equal. Describe how you could make both sides equal
by moving only one matchstick. The rules are that: (a) only one stick is to be moved; (b) a stick cannot be discarded; that is, it can only be moved from one position in the equation to another; (c) a slanted stick cannot be
interpreted as a vertical matchstick; and (d) the result must be a correct arithmetic statement.

Note—This problem has two different solutions. Relevant components were calculated using the X term if
participants used this term in solving. The participants in Experiment 1 were given the answer that involved the
IV term. Therefore, for all other participants, the IV term was used as the key component. Analyses using either or
both of these components of the problem as relevant components did not change the overall pattern of results.
(Manuscript received June 29, 2007;
revision accepted for publication December 8, 2007.)
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